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Interpreting interaction terms in econometric modelling is fussy. McFadden (2001) explains the 
complexity of consumers’ choice faced with complex attributes of good. He emphasizes the difficulty of 
econometric models to reveal the psychologist process which is most of the time non directly 
observable, but induces behavioral effects. The models logit and probit are the more used modelling 
consumers’ choice. However, they omit the interaction effects among the explanatory variables during the process 
of choice. These blended effects are however declared in the modifications of the consumption decision. 
The difficulty is then to interpret the coefficients associated with these interaction variables. Aï Norton (2003) 
have demonstrated, in the case of non linear models, that these coefficients could not be appreciate with a 
simple t-test. To solve this problem, we propose a decision rule enforceable whatever the nature of the 
estimators and for each kind of models, linear and non-linear. We build a simple rule decision, which 
offers an easy lecture and then becomes very convenient. We carry out an application of this decision 
rule to the choices of the wine consumers confronted with increasingly sophisticated products: which 
arbitrations to realize between the color, the degree or the type of wine when these various attributes 
combine on the labels and on increasingly broad rays? How to take into account these combinations of 
attributes for better understanding the processes of choice of the consumers? Using data from ONIVINS - 
Recensement exhaustif des premiers contrats de vente non AOC de 1987 `a 2003 (fctv03) - we give an 
experimental result describing the arbitration of wine consumers between color, degree and type of French 
wine. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Interaction effects are very seldom treated in econometrics. The explanation of a phenomenon 
is however sensitive to this type of information (Asher & Popkin, 1984). In the consumer 
theory, for example, decisions are made at the end of an arbitration which is often badly 
perceived by the standard econometric models. Interpreting decisions of consumers’ choice 
requires taking into account psychological factors which are not always perceptible in the step 
of econometric estimation. This complexity is notably reported by McFadden (2001) when he 
relates a history of econometric modellings in that context :  
‘The characterization of alternatives in the [multinomial logit] model in terms of their 
“hedonic” attributes was natural for this problem, and followed the psychometric tradition of 
describing alternatives in terms of physical stimuli’(p.354). 
He specifies a little further that : 
‘[…] most applications of the standard model leave out dependence on experience, and much 
of the power of this model lies in its ability to explain most patterns of economic behaviour 
without having to account for experience or perceptions’ (p.356). 
Nonlinear models like logit or probit are the most used modelling consumers’ choice because 
they allow discrimination among decisions. Nevertheless, a weakness of these models, and of 
econometric models in their standard use, is to omit interaction effects among explanatory 
variables in the choice process. These blended effects are however declared by the 
modifications of consumption decision when an individual must arbitrate between several 
goods combining several attributes but various ways. The supply of consumption goods is 
today ever more heterogeneous, even complex, insofar as a same good can associate various 
characteristics of single goods. In most cases, the combination of attributes is not perceived as 
purely additive. The association of attributes singly enhancive is only exceptionally perceived 
like the exact addition of the utility provided by each attribute taken separately. Restoring this 
process of consumers’ choice requires the introduction of interaction effects in econometric 
models, that they are linear or not. The way to introduce these interactions is to add 
combinations  of attributes to individual explanatory variables. These combinations are 
introduced by the product of couples of variables. The model is increased in these interaction 
effects, and these effects are estimated as all the others variables coefficients. The difficulty is 
to interpret coefficients associated to these interaction variables. Unlike the natural3 
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 The term « natural » is related to non blended variables. 
explanatory variables whose coefficients signify elasticities (in linear models) or variations in 
relation to a reference (in nonlinear models), estimate coefficients of combinations of 
variables are much more discerning. In linear models the t-test gives straight significance of 
such a coefficient. Aï & Norton (2003) proved that statistical significance in nonlinear models 
cannot be tested with just a t-test : they are conditioned by independent variables. In this case, 
we must take into account non unit modifications of the utility introduced by the natural 
variables combination. 
In this paper, we discuss the significance of interaction coefficients and suggest a decision 
rule able to arbitrate among several values of these coefficients at the end of the estimation 
process, in linear and nonlinear models. In a second section, we develop definition and 
implications of interaction terms according to models used, linear and non linear. In a third 
section, we explicit the decision rule useful to interpret interaction terms estimate. In a fourth 
section, we carry out an application of this rule of decision on a segment of the French wine 
consumption market. We conclude about usefulness and performance of this decision rule 
distinguishing processes of consumers’ choice when they are confronted with complex goods. 
 
 
 
2. Defining and interpreting interaction terms 
 
Theoretical bases of econometric modelling4 advocate to describe a phenomenon (the 
explained variable) starting from variables (explanatory) independent between them. This 
modelling exercise is carried in a context ceteris paribus : the information contained in the 
selected explanatory variables must provide the possible best estimate of the phenomenon one 
have to explain. The standard model is : 
εβα ++= ∑
=
n
i
ii XY
1
       (1) 
where  Y  a phenomenon to explain, 
α  a constant, 
iX  explanatory variables, 
iβ   estimate coefficients, 
ε   estimate error, representing all the information not take into account by the model. 
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 We make reference to the first probabilistic econometric works of Haavelmo (1940, 1944). 
 The performance of modeling is thus closely related to the informative capacity of the 
explanatory variables. However, most of the time the econometrician is out this framework 
and must be satisfied with a rough estimate, appreciated notably by the value of the 
coefficient of determination. One is entitled to wonder whether, whereas the most relevant 
variables were selected, there would not be an information residual in interaction terms 
between these variables. Bowles (1970) indicates the absence of theoretical bases as the main 
difficulty. He emphasizes the relevance of interaction terms :  
‘[…] The crucial deficiency is not in the lack of the data but the absence of a theory of 
learning to guide us in establishing a model for our estimation. One consequence of this lack 
of theory has been the tendency of researchers to ignore interaction effects of inputs’. (1970, 
p.13) 
Interaction terms inform about complementary relations among explanatory variables. One 
distinguishes straightforward effects (explanatory variables coefficients) and blended effects 
(interaction terms) relative to combinations. The phenomenon is better explained and the 
estimate residual,ε , is reduced. Asher & Popkin (1984) reveal that omission of interaction 
effects can leads to wrong results. They prove that introducting interaction effects increases 
the understanding of this discrepancy, while their omission maintains odd discrepencies . 
The impact of the estimation of interaction terms is pregnant especially for consumers’ choice 
models. When the consumer must express a choice face to several goods offering similar 
attributes, how appraising his decision-making processes ? The knowledge about interaction 
effects can be a response. 
 
Introducing interaction terms depends on some explanatory variables or on another effect[3]5. 
In the quantitative case, the model is : 
εββα +++= 2211 XXY      (2) 
The model including interaction between two variables 1X and 2X  is : 
εβββα ++++= 21122211 XXXXY     (3) 
In the linear model, marginal effects are : 
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 Interaction terms do not introduced collinearity between variables. The formula for a collinearity relationship is 
: 2211 XX αα +  while the interaction variable is noted : ))(( 2211 XX αα . It is based on the weighted product 
of the explanatory variables. See, for example, Friedrich (1982). 
 
2121
1
X
X
Y ββ +=
∂
∂
      (4) 
 
1122
2
X
X
Y ββ +=
∂
∂
      (5) 
and the interaction marginal effect is : 
12
12
2
21
2
β=
∂∂
∂
=
∂∂
∂
XX
Y
XX
Y
    (6) 
 
In the non linear model, because the form of the distribution function is respectively : 
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So marginal effects are (for logit model): 
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and the interaction marginal effect, from (6’), is : 
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Thereafter, we develop only the linear model (arguments can be transposable to nonlinear 
models from equations (4’), (5’) et (6’)). Nevertheless, we observe that in the nonlinear case 
the interaction term is wider than the estimate coefficient 12β produced by the estimate, but 
must be recomputed using equation (6’), as explained in Aï & Norton (2003). 
 
 
 
3. Decision rule 
 
The estimation of the interaction term in the linear case is directly performed at the time of the 
estimation of the model. Its significance is given by a t-test. However, the interpretation of 
this interaction coefficient is not so easy than those of the natural explanatory variables. 
Because 12β  conveys a residual blended effect between explanatory variables, we must 
distinguish four possible cases : 
 
• The combination contributes nothing else : variables are independent, 
• The combination overvalues attributes, 
• The combination leads to an undervaluation of attributes, 
• The combination leads to disutility. 
 
Arbitration between these cases differs according to the sign of 1β  and 2β  : 
 
 
1β  and 2β  > 0 1β  and 2β  < 0 1
β > 0 and 2β < 0 
with 21 ββ >  
Independance 
12β  = 0 
Overvaluation 12
β > 0 
211221 βββββ +>++  ] [ ] [+∞+∈ ;00;2112 Uβββ  12β  > 1β  
Undervaluation 
12β < 0 
with 
0< 21 ββ + + 2112 βββ +<   
 
] [2112 ;βββ ∈  
with 21 ββ >  ] [ ] [1212 ;00; βββ U∈  
Disutility 12
β < 0  
with 21 ββ + + 12β <0 ] [2112 ; βββ +∞−∈  12β  < 2β  
Table 1 – The decision rule 
 
 
Adaptation to nonlinear models : this decision rule also fits over nonlinear models if one 
respects formulations of equations (4’), (5’) et (6’) adapted from Aï & Norton (2003). For a 
straightforward use of the decision rule, it is enough to write : 
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and replace ( )1221 ,, βββ  by ( )1221 ,, δδδ . 
 
 
4. Empirical example : the case of French wine market 
 
The database used is a census of all first ‘mise en marché’. Completeness is guaranteed by the 
compulsory nature of the questionnaire. 
This database is implemented by ONIVINS from 1987 to 2003.  
The questionnaire is composed of three parts: 
 
 The first one describes contractors characteristics. 
The second one describes products: quantity, quality, color, price of degree/hl… 
The third one defines the contract financial terms. 
 
Anonymity must be guaranteed. The first part is so limited to general information. We know 
neither name nor localisation at municipal level 
In a contract, we can have several different products exchanged. All characteristics relative to 
those products are defined. For each one, we have price, quantity… All products are 
distinguished and that’s why we work with the unity “product”. 
 
We estimate a linear model based on characteristics of French wine as : 
• color : red = 1, others = 0,  
• degree, 
• type : table wine = 0, country wine =1  
The dependent variable, Y, is the price of the hectolitre degree, expressed in euros. The results 
are : 
 
 We can observe that introducing interaction terms increases the quality of the model, based on 
the R² value. 
 
Using the decision rule, we can conclude to the under valuation for both of the combinations : 
 
• Color and degree  
We observe that 1β  and 2β  are positives but 12β  is negative : 
1β = 0.3272809 ; 2β = 0.3053606 ; 12β = -0.0359309  
1β + 2β = 0.63264089 and 1β + 2β + 12β = 0.5967099 ⇒ 1β + 2β + 12β < 1β + 2β  
So, we are in the case of undervaluation. 
• Color and type  
We observe that 1β  and 2β  are positives but 12β  is negative : 
1β = 0.3272809 ; 2β = 1.602212 ; 12β = -0.7639122  
1β + 2β = 1.924929 and 1β + 2β + 12β = 1.1655807 ⇒ 1β + 2β + 12β < 1β + 2β  
So, we are in the case of undervaluation too. 
 
In both cases, we conclude that the combination of attributes does not increase the utility of 
the wine product. Consumers do not pay much for a red wine with more degrees (combination 
color / degree) – which is often considered as “bad” wine – that for red country wine 
(combination color / type) – which is not usually considered as a good product. A good red 
wine must be an AOC, while the worst is a red table wine in the consumers practices. This is 
why the estimate result validates undervaluation and not disutility. These combinations reveal 
an undervaluation of consumers’ preferences within the French wine market.  
 
 5. Conclusion 
 
Observing Aï & Norton advices, we have built a decision rule for interaction terms. The 
arbitration between these combined effects is often omitted in the exercises of applied 
econometrics because it is complex. This decision rule increases not only the comprehension 
of consumers’ preferences but also makes it possible to qualify their behaviors. One of its 
advantages is to be very simple of use : once the model estimated, it is enough to control the 
sign of the coefficients and to calculate their sum ; then, we apply the decision rule as 
presented in table 1 to qualify the contribution of interaction terms. Another advantage is that 
this decision rule applies as well to the linear models with the nonlinear models.  
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